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  1. Cloudflare Warp: beta clients for Windows and Mac are now available Internet company Cloudflare launched its DNS service to the public on April 1, 2018. Besides using one of the easiest to remember IP addresses, Cloudflare promised that would be one of the fastest DNS services, support DNS-over-HTTPS and DNS-over-TLS, and that it would honor user privacy. Cloudflare is one of the options in many, currently experimental, DNS-over-HTTPS implementations in web browsers (Chrome, Firefox) and operating systems (Windows). Cloudflare added optional filters to its service in April 2020 which block block access to undesirable sites on the DNS level. Cloudflare launched a companion app for its DNS service for Android and iOS in 2018, and extended the functionality with its WARP VPN service in 2019. The application enables the use of the company's DNS service on mobile devices, and users may also connect to the VPN service to improve protection further. Warp users get 100 Megabytes for free but need to subscribe for $4 per month for unlimited data. Warp and apps were only available for mobile operating systems up until now. Cloudflare published the first public beta clients of the programs for Microsoft Windows and Apple Macintosh devices this week. The download page reveals that the program is compatible with 64-bit Windows 10 version 1909 and newer versions of Windows, and Mac OS 10.15 or newer. Installation of the Windows client is straightforward; you need to accept the terms on first run before you can start using the client. Cloudflare Warp sits in the system tray area when it is launched. A click displays the main interface featuring a big toggle to connect or disconnect to the VPN network. Select the settings icon to switch between using Warp and, and only the DNS service The latter may be more convenient than setting up the DNS information manually, but it is better to configure the DNS provider manually as you won't need to run the software on your system for that task. The preferences list some useful options. You can change the DNS protocol from WARP to either DNS-over-HTTPS or DNS-over-TLS, and enable for Families functionality there if you want that. The few remaining options allow you to add networks that you want WARP to be disabled on automatically and to reset the encryption keys. The service worked fine during tests, but since it is labeled beta, it should only be run in test environments. Closing Words The beta Warp client for desktop systems enables you to connect to the WARP network and sue the DNS service. It is easy to use but lacks plenty of options and features, e.g. kill-switch functionality, that dedicated VPN clients from established companies offer. It is a beta version on the other hand and there is a possibility that some options and features will be introduced before it hits stable. Cloudflare Warp: beta clients for Windows and Mac are now available
  2. A Chrome feature is creating enormous load on global root DNS servers Google is doing to DNS what D-Link once did to NTP. 181 with 87 posters participating, including story author The Chromium browser—open source, upstream parent to both Google Chrome and the new Microsoft Edge—is getting some serious negative attention for a well-intentioned feature that checks to see if a user's ISP is "hijacking" non-existent domain results. The Intranet Redirect Detector, which makes spurious queries for random "domains" statistically unlikely to exist, is responsible for roughly half of the total traffic the world's root DNS servers receive. Verisign engineer Matt Thomas wrote a lengthy APNIC blog post outlining the problem and defining its scope. How DNS resolution normally works Enlarge / These servers are the final authority which must be consulted to resolve .com, .net, and so forth—and to tell you that 'frglxrtmpuf' isn't a real TLD. Jim Salter DNS, or the Domain Name System, is how computers translate relatively memorable domain names like arstechnica.com into far less memorable IP addresses, like Without DNS, the Internet couldn't exist in a human-usable form—which means unnecessary load on its top-level infrastructure is a real problem. Loading a single modern webpage can require a dizzying number of DNS lookups. When we analyzed ESPN's front page, we counted 93 separate domain names—from a.espncdn.com to z.motads.com—which needed to be performed in order to fully load the page! In order to keep the load manageable for a lookup system that must service the entire world, DNS is designed as a many-stage hierarchy. At the top of this pyramid are the root servers—each top-level domain, such as .com, has its own family of servers that are the ultimate authority for every domain beneath it. One step above those are the actual root servers, a.root-servers.net through m.root-servers.net. How often does this happen? A very small percentage of the world's DNS queries actually reaches the root servers, due to the DNS infrastructure's multilevel caching hierarchy. Most people will get their DNS resolver information directly from their ISP. When their device needs to know how to reach arstechnica.com, the query first goes to that local ISP-managed DNS server. If the local DNS server doesn't know the answer, it will forward the query to its own "forwarders," if any are defined. If neither the ISP's local DNS server nor any "forwarders" defined in its configuration have the answer cached, the query eventually bubbles up directly to the authoritative servers for the domain above the one you're trying to resolve—for arstechnica.com, that would mean querying the authoritative servers for com itself, at gtld-servers.net. The gtld-servers system queried responds with a list of authoritative nameservers for the arstechnica.com domain, along with at least one "glue" record containing the IP address for one such nameserver. Now, the answers percolate back down the chain—each forwarder passes those answers down to the server that queried it until the answer finally reaches both the local ISP server and the user's computer—and all of them along the line cache that answer to avoid bothering any "upstream" systems unnecessarily. For the vast majority of such queries, the NS records for arstechnica.com will already be cached at one of those forwarding servers, so the root servers needn't be bothered. So far, though, we're talking about a more familiar sort of URL—one that resolves to a normal website. Chrome's queries hit a level above that, at the actual root-servers.net clusters themselves. Chromium and the NXDomain hijack test Enlarge / Chromium's "is this DNS server f'ng with me?" probes represent about half of all the traffic reaching Verisign's DNS root-server cluster. Matthew Thomas The Chromium browser—parent project to Google Chrome, the new Microsoft Edge, and countless other lesser-known browsers—wants to offer users the simplicity of a single-box search, sometimes known as an "Omnibox." In other words, you type both real URLs and search engine queries into the same text box in the top of your browser. Taking ease-of-use one step further, it doesn't force you to actually type the http:// or https:// part of the URL, either. As convenient as it might be, this approach requires the browser to understand what should be treated as a URL and what should be treated as a search query. For the most part, this is fairly obvious—anything with spaces in it won't be a URL, for example. But it gets tricky when you consider intranets—private networks, which may use equally private TLDs that resolve to actual websites. If a user on a company intranet types in "marketing" and that company's intranet has an internal website by the same name, Chromium displays an infobar asking the user whether they intended to search for "marketing" or browse to https://marketing. So far, so good—but many ISPs and shared Wi-Fi providers hijack every mistyped URL, redirecting the user to an ad-laden landing page of some sort. Generate randomly Chromium's authors didn't want to have to see "did you mean" infobars on every single-word search in those common environments, so they implemented a test: on startup or change of network, Chromium issues DNS lookups for three randomly generated seven-to-15-character top-level "domains." If any two of those requests come back with the same IP address, Chromium assumes the local network is hijacking the NXDOMAIN errors it should be receiving—so it just treats all single-word entries as search attempts until further notice. Unfortunately, on networks that aren't hijacking DNS query results, those three lookups tend to propagate all the way up to the root nameservers: the local server doesn't know how to resolve qwajuixk, so it bounces that query up to its forwarder, which returns the favor, until eventually a.root-servers.net or one of its siblings has to say "Sorry, that's not a domain." Since there are about 1.67*10^21 possible seven-to-15-character fake domain names, for the most part every one of these probes issued on an honest network bothers a root server eventually. This adds up to a whopping half the total load on the root DNS servers, if we go by the statistics from Verisign's portion of the root-servers.net clusters. History repeats itself This isn't the first time a well-meaning project has swamped or nearly swamped a public resource with unnecessary traffic—we were immediately reminded of the long, sad story of D-Link and Poul-Henning Kamp's NTP (Network Time Protocol) server, from the mid-2000s. In 2005, Poul-Henning Kamp—a FreeBSD developer, who also ran Denmark's only Stratum 1 Network Time Protocol server—got an enormous unexpected bandwidth bill. To make a long story short, D-Link developers hardcoded Stratum 1 NTP server addresses, including Kamp's, into firmware for the company's line of switches, routers, and access points. This immediately increased the bandwidth usage of Kamp's server ninefold, causing the Danish Internet Exchange to change his bill from "Free" to "That'll be $9,000 per year, please." The problem wasn't that there were too many D-Link routers—it was that they were "jumping the chain of command." Much like DNS, NTP is intended to operate in a hierarchical fashion—Stratum 0 servers feed Stratum 1 servers, which feed Stratum 2 servers, and on down the line. A simple home router, switch, or access point like the ones D-Link had hardcoded these NTP servers into should be querying a Stratum 2 or Stratum 3 server. The Chromium project, presumably with the best intentions in mind, has translated the NTP problem into a DNS problem by loading down the Internet's root servers with queries they should never have to process. Resolution hopefully in sight There's an open bug in the Chromium project requesting that the Intranet Redirect Detector be disabled by default to resolve this issue. To be fair to the Chromium project, the bug was actually opened before Verisign's Matt Thomas drew a giant red circle around the issue in his APNIC blog post. The bug was opened in June but languished until Thomas' post; since Thomas' post, it has received daily attention. Hopefully, the issue will soon be resolved—and the world's root DNS servers will no longer need to answer about 60 billion bogus queries every day. Listing image by Matthew Thomas A Chrome feature is creating enormous load on global root DNS servers
  3. Understanding DNS—anatomy of a BIND zone file Need a clear, thorough guide to understanding how DNS records work? We got you. Enlarge / What does this stream of binary digits have to do with DNS? Nothing, really—but good luck finding a pretty pic somewhere that does! Santo Heston 73 with 57 posters participating, including story author If you want to be a sysadmin or network administrator of any kind, there's a fundamental technology you really need to understand—DNS, the Domain Name System. There was a time when a sysadmin with no aspirations to managing Internet-accessible services might have gotten by without understanding DNS, but that time is long, long gone. You can't learn everything there is to know about DNS in a single article. But that's not what we're looking to do today; instead, we want to give you a clear, concise guide to the structure and meaning of the most important part of the Domain Name System: a zone file, as seen in BIND, the Berkeley Internet Name Daemon. Sample zone file Enlarge / This sample zone file doesn't have every possible record type in it—but it's a good start. Jim Salter Origin and TTL Above, we have a small but complete example of a typical zone file—in fact, it's an anonymized version of a production zone file on a domain I manage. Let's go through it line by line. $ORIGIN tld. $TTL 5m Whenever you see an $ORIGIN line in a zone file, this is a shortcut that lets BIND know that any unterminated hostname references following that line should be presumed to end in the argument following $ORIGIN. In this case, that's .tld—the fictional Top Level Domain for example.tld. The next line, $TTL 5m, declares that following lines will have a Time To Live of five minutes. This relatively short value means that remote DNS resolvers should only cache records retrieved from this zone for five minutes before requesting them again. If you're relatively certain that your DNS for a given domain won't change very often, you might consider increasing that value in order to reduce the number of times remote hosts must query your nameserver—but keep in mind that a longer TTL also means longer periods of downtime, when you must make a change to your DNS (or make a change that accidentally breaks it). Both $ORIGIN and $TTL can be defined multiple times in the same zone—each time you redefine them, you change their value for any lines beneath the new values in the same zone file. SOA record example IN SOA ns1.example.tld. hostmaster.example.tld. ( 90 ; serial 4h ; refresh 15m ; retry 8h ; expire 4m) ; negative caching TTL The first actual record in our sample zone file—or in any normal zone file—is the SOA record, which tells us the Start Of Authority for the domain. It's also easily the most confusing record type in the entire DNS system. For any record listing, including this SOA record, the first argument is the hostname the record applies to—in this case, example. Remember how we set $ORIGIN tld on the first line of the zone file? That means that this unterminated hostname example expands to example.tld—so, we're defining the SOA for the FQDN (fully qualified domain name) example.tld. We're referring to this hostname example as "unterminated" because it doesn't end in a dot. If we wanted to bypass the $ORIGIN setting and refer to a FQDN directly, we'd terminate it with a final dot—eg, example.tld. would be the FQDN here, with the trailing dot. The next argument we see is IN, short for "Internet." This is the record class. There are other DNS record classes, but you can easily go your entire career without seeing one of them (such as CH, for Chaos) in production. The record class is optional; if omitted, BIND will assume that the record being specified is of class IN. We recommend not omitting it, however, lest something change and all your zone files suddenly be broken after a BIND update! The next two arguments are FQDNs—at least, they look like it. The first FQDN really is an FQDN, and it should be the FQDN of the primary name server for the domain itself—in this case, ns1.example.tld. Note that you can use unterminated hostnames here—for example, we could have just used ns1.example for this argument, which would have expanded to ns1.example.tld. thanks to our $ORIGIN .tld line—but it's probably best to be explicit here. The second FQDN, hostmaster.example.tld., isn't actually an FQDN at all. Instead, it's a perverse way of rewriting an email address. @ is a reserved character in zone files, and the original BIND uses the first section of this "FQDN" as the user portion of an email address—so, this would translate to the address [email protected] It's incredibly common to see this screwed up in real-life zone files—thankfully, it doesn't much matter. We're not aware of literally anyone who actually uses this feature of a DNS zone to contact anyone. Moving on, we have serial, refresh, retry, expire, and negative TTL for the zone inside parentheses. Note that the comments you see here labeling them are not required—and in real life, you'll rarely see them. We strongly prefer to put these comments in production zone files in order to make it easier to read them, but BIND itself doesn't care! serial—this is a simple serial number for the zone file, which must be incremented each time the contents of the zone are changed. If you don't update the zone file serial, your changes to the zone will not be picked up by DNS resolvers that have previously cached records from your zone! This used to be a YYMMDDnn format in days gone by—but that format is no longer required, or in some cases even supported. Just start your zones with serial 1, increment to 2 the next time you make a change to the zone, and so forth. refresh—after this period of time, secondary nameservers should query the primary nameserver for this SOA record, to detect changes in serial number. If the serial number has incremented, any cached records must be invalidated and fetched again from the primary nameserver. retry—if the primary nameserver doesn't respond to an SOA request, a secondary nameserver should wait this long before attempting to query the primary nameserver again. expire—if the primary nameserver has failed to respond to a secondary nameserver's SOA request for this period of time, the secondary nameserver should stop offering DNS resolution for the domain entirely. negative caching TTL—this controls how long a "negative" response—eg, "I don't have the record you're asking for"—should be cached. One of the most common areas for confusion in the SOA record is what effect the refresh, retry, and expire arguments have. These arguments don't affect DNS resolvers at all—only secondary authoritative nameservers for the domain. if you don't have one or more secondary nameservers for your domain, which use BIND replication to retrieve updates from the primary, these arguments won't have any effect at all. One final note: older versions of BIND required all of these times to be in seconds... even when the actual time interval was in days, or weeks. BIND9—released almost 20 years ago, in October 2000—supports human-readable time sufffixes such as "m" for minutes, "h" for hours, and "d" for days. Please use these human readable suffixes when writing zone files; nobody should have to break out a calculator to figure out that 86,400 seconds is one day! NS records IN NS ns1.example.tld. IN NS ns2.example.tld. In these two records, we define the hostnames, which are authoritative nameservers for our zone. Once again, we've used dot-terminated FQDNs for these records. Once again, we could have used unterminated hostnames—ns1.example and ns2.example—and relied on our $ORIGIN .tld to expand them. Doing so would make the zone more confusing and difficult to read, though. Note that the NS record specifies hostnames, not IP addresses. This is a common source of confusion for DNS newbies, and it's important to get it right. You cannot specify a bare IP address as the nameserver for a domain; you absolutely must specify a hostname here. Finally, note that we haven't specified the domain name itself on either line—this is because we've inherited it from the SOA record above. We started that line with example, which expands to example.tld. Since we haven't specified another hostname, these new NS records also apply to that hostname by default. In the real world, you may also see zone files with $ORIGIN example.tld., and beginning the SOA and possibly other lines with the special reserved character @. When you see @ as a hostname in a zone file, that just means you're using the bare $ORIGIN without any further qualifiers. MX record(s) IN MX 10 mail.example.tld. In this simple domain, we have a single mailserver, and it's mail.example.tld. The MX record just tells anyone who wants to send email to any address at example.tld to make their SMTP connection to the hostname specified in this record. The preceding argument—10 in this case—is the numeric priority of the mailserver in this specific record. Lower numbers mean higher priority. When multiple SMTP servers are available for a domain, you'll see multiple MX records as well, each with a different priority. In theory, higher priority mailservers should always be tried first, and lower priority mailservers only tried if the higher priority server fails. Well-behaved SMTP servers do follow this protocol—but spammers have a tendency to deliberately target the lower-priority mailservers first, operating on the theory that high-priority servers might be anti-spam gateways, and the lowest priority servers might be the bare, unfiltered end server. Spammers suck. A record(s) IN A A records are the part of a zone file that actually do what most people think of DNS as doing—they translate a hostname to a bare IPv4 address. In this case, this is a sample file only—and our A record for example.tld merely resolves to localhost, on the same principle that phone numbers in movies always start with the exchange 555. In real life, of course, you'd put in the IP address of the server you expected to answer when you ping example.tld, point a Web browser to https://example.tld/, and so forth. In this simple zone file, we only have a single A record for example.tld. In real life, you might encounter several—there could be multiple gateway servers capable of answering Web requests for https://example.tld/; and if so, each would get their own A record on their own line. TXT record(s) IN TXT "v=spf1 a mx a:mail.example.tld a:www.example.tld ?all" This TXT, or text record, is still in the head section of our zone file, under the hostname example.tld. So its scope is the entire example.tld domain. You can put just about anything in a TXT record; this specific one is an SPF record, formatted to give mailservers information about what machines are authorized to emit mail on behalf of example.tld. In this case, we're saying that we're using the SPF1 version of formatting. We then inform anyone querying this record that any valid A record for example.tld is authorized to send mail on its behalf, as is any valid MX for the domain, and finally that the IP addresses associated with the A records for mail.example.tld and www.example.tld are authorized to send mail. Finally, ?all says that if any other machine says it wants to send mail from some address at example.tld, it should be allowed... but it should be examined more closely than specifically authorized hosts are. Hostnames, subdomains, and CNAMEs beneath example.tld $ORIGIN example.tld. ns1 IN A ns2 IN A www IN CNAME example.tld. mail IN AAAA ::1 mail IN A Now that we've defined everything we need to for the domain, we can start adding records for any hostnames and subdomains beneath example.tld itself. The first thing we do here is change our $ORIGIN to example.tld. Again, notice that final terminating dot—if you forget it, things are going to get really strange and you'll tear your hair out wondering why none of your records resolve properly! We see A records here for ns1, ns2, and mail. These A records work the same way that the A record for the domain itself did—we are telling BIND what IP address to resolve requests for that hostname to. We also have an AAAA record for mail.example.tld.—AAAA records are just like A records, but they're for resolving IPv6 rather than IPv4. Once again, we've chosen in our example to use a localhost address. You'll need to be familiar with AAAA records if you expect to set up your own mailserver—Google stopped being willing to talk to mailservers without fully working IPv6 DNS a few years ago! The last record type we see here is CNAME, short for Canonical Name. This is an alias—it allows you to tell BIND to always resolve requests for the CNAMEd host using the A or AAAA record specified in the target argument. In this case, www IN CNAME example.tld. means that the IP address for example.tld itself should also be handed out if somebody asks for www.example.tld. CNAME records are handy, but they're a bit funky. It's worth remembering that each level of CNAME necessitates another DNS lookup—in this case, a remote machine that asked to resolve www.example.tld would be told "please look up example.tld. in order to find your answer," and then would need to issue a separate DNS request for the A record associated with example.tld. If you have CNAMEs pointing to CNAMEs pointing to CNAMEs, you'll introduce unnecessary latency into requests for your resources, and your domain will appear "slow" and "laggy" to your users! There are further limitations in CNAME records. Remember how we told you that MX and NS records must point to hostnames, not to raw IP addresses? More specifically, they must point directly to A records, not to CNAME records. If you try to set MX mail.example.tld. followed by mail.example.tld. CNAME example.tld., your zone file will be broken, and MX lookup attempts will return errors. Tools of the trade If you're managing your own DNS, you'll need to be proficient in using command line tools to query your DNS server directly and see how it responds to requests—it's difficult to be certain whether the problem is DNS or something else just by putting https://example.tld/ in a browser and seeing what happens. dig [email protected]:~$ dig @ NS example.tld ; <<>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <<>> NS example.tld ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 51417 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1 ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 65494 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;example.tld. IN NS ;; ANSWER SECTION: example.tld. 300 IN NS ns1.example.tld. example.tld. 300 IN NS ns2.example.tld. ;; Query time: 40 msec ;; SERVER: ;; WHEN: Sat Aug 22 00:54:26 EDT 2020 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 74 If you have access to Linux, Mac, or Windows Subsystem for Linux, by far the best command line tool is dig. Using dig is as simple as specifying a server to query, the record type you want to look for, and the FQDN it should be associated with. In the example above, we asked the DNS server at to show us all NS records associated with example.tld. In addition to the answers we wanted, we got a ton of diagnostic information—the DNS server we queried did not return an ERROR when queried, it says it is authoritative for the domain in question, and so forth. You can also supply a +short argument if you want dig to just shut up and give you the answer you're looking for without all the verbose diagnostics: [email protected]:~$ dig +short @ NS example.tld ns1.example.tld. ns2.example.tld. Be aware, though, that if there aren't any answers available for a +short query—for example, if you typo the domain name—you won't get any response at all, even if the DNS server queried returned an error. [email protected]:~$ dig +short @ NS example.tmd [email protected]:~$ If you want to find out why you didn't get an answer, you'll need to lose the +short argument to find out. nslookup If you don't have access to dig, you can generally get by with nslookup. Most commonly, this is a semi-cursed workaround for users sitting at a Windows box without access to Windows Subsystem for Linux, cygwin, or some other way to gain access to more advanced tools than the Windows CLI provides. nslookup is usually invoked without arguments and queried in interactive mode. Here's a sample session: C:\> nslookup > server Default server: Address: > example.tld Server: Address: Non-authoritative answer: Name: example.tld Address: By setting server, we specified to nslookup to use that machine as the DNS server to query. You don't have to specify this; if you don't, nslookup will use whatever the default DNS resolver on your machine would. After optionally setting the server, you can just type a bare hostname into nslookup's interactive prompt, and it will return any A or AAAA records it can find for that hostname. If you want to query the remote server for a different type of record, you'll need to use a set type command. > set type=ns > example.tld Server: Address: Non-authoritative answer: example.tld nameserver = ns1.example.tld. example.tld nameserver = ns2.example.tld. Authoritative answers can be found from: > set type=mx > example.tld Server: Address: Non-authoritative answer: example.tld mail exchanger = 10 mail.example.tld. Authoritative answers can be found from: example.tld nameserver = ns2.example.tld. example.tld nameserver = ns1.example.tld. mail.example.tld internet address = > exit In the above examples, we used set type=ns and set type=mx to query the remote DNS server for NS and MX records for example.tld. It works, and you get your answers... but the syntax is fiddly, there's less diagnostic information available, it's vastly less scriptable, and if you're anything like us, you'll likely curse the antiquated thing once or twice before you're done. The proper way to get out of nslookup's interactive mode is the command exit. Hopefully, you never need to look up information about a top-level domain also named exit—or if you do, you'll have a better tool available than nslookup when you do. Conclusions Hopefully, you picked up something valuable today about how DNS works and how its information is stored. Although BIND is not the only DNS server platform out there—in particular, Windows admins will need to work with Active Directory DNS—the lessons learned here apply near-equally to all platforms and applications. Although the storage format may change somewhat from server to server—such as an Active Directory domain controller literally storing zones inside Active Directory itself, rather than a plain text file—the record types are universal, and the formatting at least near-universal. If you're a budding sysadmin or enthusiast who's interested in running your own DNS server, I highly recommend doing it—and using the original platform when you do; BIND on either Linux or BSD. The system load of running a nameserver is nearly nonexistent at any scale short of truly massive; a $5 Digital Ocean or Linode box can handle the job just fine. In addition to the sheer joy of learning how to manage these things, you may also find you value the ability to set your TTLs absurdly short—most managed DNS servers won't allow a TTL of less than 30m, and most will attempt to default you to TTLs of up to a week. This is fine and dandy for a DNS zone, which is already properly set up and doesn't need changing... but if your IP address changes and your DNS needs to change along with it, a five-minute TTL is a very, very fine thing to have. Understanding DNS—anatomy of a BIND zone file
  4. Pi-Hole on Raspberry Pi Zero: As more and more things become IoT and stay online and do who knows what about user data, it is right time to back control. This simple program can block ads at DNS level. Meaning you don't need an adblock anymore as ads never reach to you in the first place. This is truly a blackhole for ads! Minimum Requirements: Raspberry Pi Zero Wi-Fi (or new), MicroSD Card 8 GB, USB Drive, Micro USB Charger, Computer (You can use different ISO based on your preference. This looks complex but can be done in minutes! Steps: 1. Raspberry Pi OS (32-bit) Lite: https://downloads.raspberrypi.org/raspios_lite_armhf_latest 2. Write the ISO to USB Drive: https://sourceforge.net/projects/win32diskimager/ 3. In order to connect this over WiFi to your router, we have to create two files: a. wpa_supplicant.conf Create a text file with below info and then add ".conf" extension instead of .txt when you are done.: ctrl_interface=DIR=/var/run/wpa_supplicant GROUP=netdev update_config=1 country=<Insert 2 letter ISO 3166-1 country code here> network={ ssid="<Name of your wireless LAN>" psk="<Password for your wireless LAN>" } Create an empty text file and name it "ssh" without quotes. Remove the .txt extension. 4. Put both files in to "boot" folder of USB drive. Once you have written the ISO image, you will see a boot folder on USB. 5. Connect to Micro USB charger. 6. In order to connect this to your PC over your home Wi-Fi, get PuTTY: https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w32/putty-0.74-installer.msi 7. Now we need to find out the address our Pi Zero has been assigned by router. Find it from router. Usually it is in the range of 192.168.0.XXX 8. Now open PuTTY on PC. Enter above address and confirm the prompt to accept the connection from Pi Zero 9. Default username and password are "pi" and "raspberry" without any quotes. 10. Run this command and it is done! curl -sSL https://install.pi-hole.net | bash Now you can manage the Pi-Hole UI from any device over local Wi-Fi and see ads getting blocked. You can also add more adlists. Further detailed config: https://github.com/pi-hole/pi-hole
  5. Hack Brief: Microsoft Warns of a 17-Year-Old ‘Wormable’ Bug The SigRed vulnerability exists in Windows DNS, used by practically every small and medium-sized organization in the world. Photograph: JEENAH MOON/New York Times/Redux Since WannaCry and NotPetya struck the internet just over three years ago, the security industry has scrutinized every new Windows bug that could be used to create a similar world-shaking worm. Now one potentially "wormable" vulnerability—meaning an attack can spread from one machine to another with no human interaction—has appeared in Microsoft's implementation of the domain name system protocol, one of the fundamental building blocks of the internet. As part of its Patch Tuesday batch of software updates, Microsoft today released a fix for a bug discovered by Israeli security firm Check Point, which the company's researchers have named SigRed. The SigRed bug exploits Windows DNS, one of the most popular kinds of DNS software that translates domain names into IP addresses. Windows DNS runs on the DNS servers of practically every small and medium-sized organization around the world. The bug, Check Point says, has existed in that software for a remarkable 17 years. Check Point and Microsoft warn that the flaw is critical, a 10 out of 10 on the common vulnerability scoring system, an industry-standard severity rating. Not only is the bug wormable, Windows DNS software often runs on the powerful servers known as domain controllers that set the rules for networks. Many of those machines are particularly sensitive; a foothold in one would allow further penetration into other devices inside an organization. On top of all of that, says Check Point's head of vulnerability research Omri Herscovici, the Windows DNS bug can in some cases be exploited with no action on the part of the target user, creating a seamless and powerful attack. "It requires no interaction. And not only that, once you’re inside the domain controller that runs the Windows DNS server, expanding your control to the rest of the network is really easy," says Omri Herscovici. "It’s basically game over." The Hack Check Point found the SigRed vulnerability in the part of Windows DNS that handles a certain piece of data that's part of the key exchange used in the more secure version of DNS known as DNSSEC. That one piece of data can be maliciously crafted such that Windows DNS allows a hacker to overwrite chunks of memory they're not meant to have access to, ultimately gaining full remote code execution on the target server. (Check Point says Microsoft asked the company not to publicize too many details of other elements of the technique, including how it bypasses certain security features on Windows servers.) For the remote, no-interaction version of the attack that Check Point's Herscovici describes, the target DNS server would have to be exposed directly to the internet, which is rare in most networks; administrators generally run Windows DNS on servers that they keep behind a firewall. But Herscovici points out that if a hacker can get access to the local network by accessing the corporate Wi-Fi or plugging a computer into the corporate LAN, they can trigger the same DNS server takeover. And it may also be possible to exploit the vulnerability with just a link in a phishing email: Trick a target into clicking that link and their browser will initiate the same key exchange on the DNS server that gives the hacker full control of it. Check Point only demonstrated that it could crash a target DNS server with that phishing trick, not hijack it. But Jake Williams, a former National Security Agency hacker and founder of Rendition Infosec, says it's likely that the phishing trick could be finessed to allow a full takeover of the target DNS server in the vast majority of networks that don't block outbound traffic on their firewalls. "With some careful crafting, you could probably target DNS servers that are behind a firewall," Williams says. Who's Affected? While many large organizations use the BIND implementation of DNS that runs on Linux servers, smaller organizations commonly run Windows DNS, says Williams, so thousands of IT administrators will likely need to rush to patch the SigRed bug. And because the SigRed vulnerability has existed in Windows DNS since 2003, practically every version of the software has been vulnerable. While those organizations rarely expose their Windows DNS servers to the internet, both Check Point and Williams warn that many administrators have made architectural changes to networks—often questionable ones—to better allow employees to work from home since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic. That could mean more exposed Windows DNS servers that are open to full remote exploitation. "The threat landscape of internet-exposed things has risen dramatically" in recent months, Williams says. The good news, Check Point says, is that detecting SigRed exploitation of a Windows DNS server is relatively easy, given the noisy communications necessary to trigger the vulnerability. The firm says that despite the 17 years that SigRed has lingered in Windows DNS, it has yet to find any indication of an attack on its clients' networks so far. "We're not aware of anyone using this, but if they did, hopefully now it will stop," Herscovici says. But in the short term at least, Microsoft's patch could also lead to more exploitation of the bug as hackers reverse engineer the patch to discover exactly how the vulnerability can be triggered. How Serious Is This? Check Point's Herscovici argues that the SigRed bug should be taken as seriously as the flaws exploited by older Windows hacking techniques like EternalBlue and BlueKeep. Both of those Windows exploitation methods raised alarms because of their potential to spread from machine to machine over the internet. While BlueKeep never resulted in a worm or any mass hacking incidents beyond some cryptocurrency mining, EternalBlue was integrated into both the WannaCry and NotPetya worms that rampaged across global networks in the spring and summer of 2017, becoming the two most damaging computer worms in history. "I would compare this to BlueKeep or EternalBlue," says Herscovici. "If this vulnerability were to be exploited, we might get a new WannaCry." But Rendition Infosec's Williams argues that the SigRed bug is more likely to be exploited in targeted attacks. Most SigRed techniques likely won't be very reliable, given that a Windows mitigation called "control flow guard" may sometimes cause machines to crash rather than being hijacked, Williams says. And fully exposed Windows DNS servers are relatively rare, so the population of machines vulnerable to a worm isn't comparable to BlueKeep or EternalBlue. The phishing technique to exploit SigRed doesn't lend itself to a worm nearly as well, since it would require users to click a link. SigRed could, however, serve as a powerful tool for more discriminating hackers. And that means Windows administrators should rush to patch it immediately. "Technically, it's wormable, but I don't think there will be a worm based on the mechanics of this," Williams says. "But there's no question in my mind that well-funded adversaries will make an exploit for it." Hack Brief: Microsoft Warns of a 17-Year-Old ‘Wormable’ Bug
  6. Security upgrade — Firefox turns encrypted DNS on by default to thwart snooping ISPs US-based Firefox users get encrypted DNS lookups today or within a few weeks. Enlarge Getty Images | Anadolu Agency Firefox will start switching browser users to Cloudflare's encrypted-DNS service today and roll out the change across the United States in the coming weeks. "Today, Firefox began the rollout of encrypted DNS over HTTPS (DoH) by default for US-based users," Firefox maker Mozilla said in an announcement scheduled to go live at this link Tuesday morning. "The rollout will continue over the next few weeks to confirm no major issues are discovered as this new protocol is enabled for Firefox's US-based users." DNS over HTTPS helps keep eavesdroppers from seeing what DNS lookups your browser is making, potentially making it more difficult for Internet service providers or other third parties to monitor what websites you visit. As we've previously written, Mozilla's embrace of DNS over HTTPS is fueled in part by concerns about ISPs monitoring customers' Web usage. Mobile broadband providers were caught selling their customers' real-time location data to third parties, and Internet providers can use browsing history to deliver targeted ads. Wireless and wired Internet providers are suing the state of Maine to stop a Web-browsing privacy law that would require ISPs to get customers' opt-in consent before using or sharing browsing history and other sensitive data. The telecom companies already convinced Congress and President Trump to eliminate a similar federal law in 2017. ISPs protested encrypted-DNS plans Mozilla has not been deterred by a broadband-industry lobbying campaign against encrypted DNS. The ISPs' lobbying targeted Google's plan for the Chrome browser, even though Firefox is deploying DNS over HTTPS more aggressively. With Web users already being tracked heavily by companies like Google and Facebook, Mozilla has said it is embracing DNS over HTTPS because "we don't want to see that business model duplicated in the middle of the network" and "it's just a mistake to use DNS for those purposes." "Today, we know that unencrypted DNS is not only vulnerable to spying but is being exploited, and so we are helping the Internet to make the shift to more secure alternatives," Mozilla said in its announcement today. "We do this by performing DNS lookups in an encrypted HTTPS connection. This helps hide your browsing history from attackers on the network, [and] helps prevent data collection by third parties on the network that ties your computer to websites you visit." While Firefox's encrypted DNS uses Cloudflare by default, users can change that to NextDNS in the Firefox settings or manually enter the address of another encrypted-DNS service. Firefox users can also disable the new default setting if they don't want to use any of the encrypted-DNS options. Mozilla has said it is open to adding more encrypted-DNS providers as long as they meet a list of requirements for privacy and transparency and don't block or filter domains by default "unless specifically required by law in the jurisdiction in which the resolver operates." Mozilla isn't turning encrypted DNS on automatically outside the United States. But users outside the US and US-based users who haven't gotten the new default setting yet can enable DNS over HTTPS in the Firefox settings. To do that, go to Firefox "Preferences," then "General," scroll all the way down to "Network Settings," click "Settings," then click "Enable DNS over HTTPS." After clicking that box, you can choose Cloudflare, choose NextDNS, or enter a custom server. There's a list of encrypted-DNS servers at this Github page. Encrypted DNS will not be turned on by default in certain cases, such as when Firefox detects that enterprise policies have been set on the device or when it detects the presence of parental controls. Those and other questions about how DNS over HTTPS works in Firefox are answered in this FAQ. Google's plan for encrypted DNS in Chrome—which is still in the experimental phase and hasn't been deployed to everyone—is a little different from Mozilla's. Instead of automatically switching users to a DNS provider chosen by Google, Chrome sticks with whichever DNS provider the user has selected. If the user-selected DNS provider offers encrypted lookups and is in this list of providers, Chrome automatically upgrades the user to that DNS provider's encrypted service. If the user-selected DNS provider isn't in the list, Chrome makes no changes. Source: Firefox turns encrypted DNS on by default to thwart snooping ISPs (Ars Technica)
  7. Microsoft will integrate DNS over HTTPS in Windows 10 Microsoft revealed plans to integrate native support for DNS over HTTPS in the company's Windows 10 operating system in November 2019. The announcement was made on Microsoft's Networking blog on November 17, 2019. DNS over HTTPS is designed to improve privacy, security and the reliability by encrypting DNS queries that are handled in plaintext currently. DNS over HTTPS has been on the rise lately. Mozilla, Google, Opera as as well as several public DNS providers announced support for the standard. Support in programs, e.g. a web browser, means that the DNS queries that originate from that program are encrypted. Other queries, e.g. from another browser that does not support DNS over HTTPS or is configured not to use it, won't benefit from that integration however. Microsoft's announcement brings DNS over HTTPS support to the Windows operating system. The company plans to introduce it to preview builds of Windows 10 in the future before it releases it in a final version of the operating system. Microsoft plans to follow Google's implementation, at least initially. Google revealed some time ago that it will roll out DNS over HTTPS in Chrome, but only on systems that use a DNS service that supports DNS over HTTPS. In other words: Google won't alter the DNS provider of the system. Mozilla and Opera decided to pick a provider, at least initially, and that means that the local DNS provider may be overridden in the browser. Microsoft notes that it won't be making changes to the DNS server configuration of the Windows machine. Administrators (and users) are in control when it comes to the selection of the DNS provider on Windows and the introduction of support for DNS over HTTPS on Windows won't change that. The change may benefit users without them knowing about it. If a system is configured to use a DNS provider that supports DNS over HTTPS, that system will automatically use the new standard so that DNS data is encrypted. The company plans to introduce "more privacy-friendly ways" for its customers to discover DNS settings in Windows and raise awareness for DNS over HTTPS in the operating system. Microsoft revealed four guiding principles for the implementation: Windows DNS needs to be as private and functional as possible by default without the need for user or admin configuration because Windows DNS traffic represents a snapshot of the user’s browsing history. Privacy-minded Windows users and administrators need to be guided to DNS settings even if they don't know what DNS is yet. Windows users and administrators need to be able to improve their DNS configuration with as few simple actions as possible. Windows users and administrators need to explicitly allow fallback from encrypted DNS once configured. Closing words Microsoft did not reveal a schedule for the integration but it is clear that it will land in a future Insider build for Windows 10 first. Integration in Windows -- and other client operating systems -- makes more sense than integrating the functionality into individual programs. Users who want to use DNS over HTTPS may simply pick a DNS provider that supports it to enable the feature for all applications that run on the system. Source: Microsoft will integrate DNS over HTTPS in Windows 10 (gHacks - Martin Brinkmann)
  8. Google plans to test DNS over HTTPS in Chrome 78 Google revealed plans to test the company's implementation of DNS over HTTPS (DoH) in Chrome 78. DNS over HTTPS aims to improve security and privacy of DNS requests by utilizing HTTPS. The current stable version of Chrome is 77 released on September 10, 2019. Google notes that DoH prevents other WiFi users from seeing visited websites; common attacks such as spoofing or pharming could potentially be prevented by using DoH. Google decided to test the DoH implementation in a different way than Mozilla. Mozilla selected Cloudflare as its partner in the testing phase and will use Cloudflare as the default provider when it rolls out the feature to US users in late September 2019. Firefox users have options to change the DNS over HTTPS provider or turn off the feature entirely in the browser. Google's DNS over HTTPS plan Google picked a different route for the test. The company decided to test the implementation using multiple DoH providers. The company could have used its own DoH service for the tests but decided to select multiple providers instead. Tests will upgrade Chrome installations to use DoH if the DNS service that is used on the system supports DoH. Google circumnavigates any criticism in regards to privacy that Mozilla faced when it announced the partnership with Cloudflare. Google selected the cooperating providers for "their strong stance on security and privacy" and "readiness of their DoH services" and agreement to participate in the test. The following providers were picked by the company: Cleanbrowsing Cloudflare DNS.SB Google OpenDNS Quad9 If Chrome runs on a system that uses one of these services for DNS, it will start using DoH instead when Chrome 78 launches. The experiment will run on all platforms for a fraction of Chrome users with the exception of Chrome on Linux and iOS. Chrome will revert to the regular DNS service in the case of errors. Most managed Chrome deployments will be excluded from the experiment, and Google plans to provide details on DoH policies on the company's Chrome Enterprise blog before release to provide administrators with information on configuring those. Chrome users may use the flag chrome://flags/#dns-over-http to opt in or out of the experiment. The flag is not integrated in any version of the Chrome browser yet. Secure DNS lookups Enables DNS over HTTPS. When this feature is enabled, your browser may try to use a secure HTTPS connection to look up the addresses of websites and other web resources. – Mac, Windows, Chrome OS, Android Closing Words Most Chromium-based browsers and Firefox will start to use DNS over HTTPS in the near future. Firefox provides options to disable the feature and Chrome comes with an experimental flag that offers the same. Experimental flags may be removed at one point in the future however and it is unclear at this point whether Google plans to add a switch to Chrome's preference to enable or disable the feature. Source: Google plans to test DNS over HTTPS in Chrome 78 (gHacks - Martin Brinkmann)
  9. Mozilla plans to roll out DNS over HTTPS to US users in late September 2019 Starting in late September 2019, DNS over HTTPS (DoH) is going to be rolled out to Firefox users in the United States. DNS over HTTPS encrypts DNS requests to improve security and privacy of these requests. Most DNS requests happen in the open currently; anyone listening to the traffic gets records of site and IP addresses that were looked up while using an Internet connection among other things. DoH encrypts the traffic and while that looks good on first glance, it needs to be noted that TLS still gives away the destination in plaintext. One example: Internet providers may block certain DNS requests, e.g. when they have received a court order to block certain resources on the Internet. It is not the best method to prevent people from accessing a site on the Internet but it is used nevertheless. DoH is excellent against censorship that uses DNS manipulation. Tip: check out our detailed guide on configuring DNS over HTTPS in Firefox. Mozilla started to look into the implementation of DoH in Firefox in 2018. The organization ran a controversial Shield study in 2018 to gather data that it needed for the planned implementation of the feature. The study was controversial because Mozilla used the third-party Cloudflare as the DNS over HTTPS service which meant that all user traffic flowed through the Cloudflare network. Mozilla revealed in April 2019 that its plan to enable DoH in Firefox had not changed. The organization created a list of policies that DoH providers had to conform to if they wanted their service to be integrated in Firefox. In "What's next in making encrypted DNS-over-HTTPS the Default", Mozilla confirmed that it would begin to enable DoH in Firefox starting in late September 2019. The feature will be enabled for some users from the United States and Mozilla plans to monitor the implementation before DoH is rolled out to a larger part of the user base and eventually all users from the United States. We plan to gradually roll out DoH in the USA starting in late September. Our plan is to start slowly enabling DoH for a small percentage of users while monitoring for any issues before enabling for a larger audience. If this goes well, we will let you know when we’re ready for 100% deployment. While DNS over HTTPS will be the default for the majority of Firefox installations in the United States, it won't be enabled for some configurations: If parental controls are used, DoH won't be enabled provided that Mozilla detects the use correctly. Enterprise configurations are respected as well and DoH is disabled unless "explicitly enabled by enterprise configuration". Fall back option if DNS issues or split horizon configuration cause lookup failures. Network administrations may configure their networks in the following way to highlight to Firefox that the network is unsuitable for DoH usage: DNS queries for the A and AAAA records for the domain “use-application-dns.net” must respond with NXDOMAIN rather than the IP address retrieved from the authoritative nameserver. How to block DNS over HTTPS You have two options when it comes to DoH in Firefox. You can change the default provider -- Cloudflare is the default -- to another provider (for whatever reason) or block the entire feature so that it won't be used. If you don't want to use it, set the value of network.trr.mode to 0 5 on about:config. Source: Mozilla plans to roll out DNS over HTTPS to US users in late September 2019 (gHacks - Martin Brinkmann)
  10. How to configure the DNS in iOS We taught you how to configure Safari in iOS to take control of how the browser works. Continuing with our internet tweaks, we are going to tell you how to configure the DNS in iOS. You should know that there is one huge drawback in iOS concerning DNS. You can only set a custom DNS if you are connected to a Wi-Fi connection. You cannot change the DNS on mobile networks, it’s just bizarre. One option around this would be to use a VPN instead that uses its own DNS service. When Android Pie was launched, many praised the addition of a native DNS option. Many iOS users aren’t aware that this option has been in their iPhone/iPad for a long time. The reason why they may not have known about it, is because it isn’t kind of visible in the settings. You’ll understand why we say this in a moment. How to configure the DNS in iOS 1. Open the Settings app on your iPhone or iPad 2. Navigate to the Wi-Fi options on the side-bar. 3. Now, on the right pane, you will see the name of the Wi-Fi network you are connected to. It will have a blue checkmark next to it, to indicate it is working fine. 4. Tap anywhere on the line with the Wi-Fi network’s name or the icons on the edge. This open’s the settings which are specific to the selected network. 5. Scroll down till you say the Configure DNS option. If it says “Automatic”, it means no custom DNS has been enabled, and the network is connecting to your ISP’s DNS servers. 6. Tap on Configure DNS, and then on the “Manual” option. Now you will see an Add server option. 7. Use this to set any DNS that you want to. Don’t forget to hit the save button on the top right corner, to finish adding the DNS server. Okay, you probably guessed this. Yeah, if you have more than one Wi-Fi networks, you’re going to need to setup a DNS for each of those. Here are a few popular public DNS services which are reliable: CloudFlare DNS: and (Cloudflare has DNS apps for Android and iOS as well= AdGuard DNS: and OpenDNS: and Quad9 DNS: and Google DNS: and AdGuard DNS is very useful, because it acts as a system-wide ad blocker. You can check out our Adguard DNS review here. Closing Words Personally, I don’t like Apple’s Settings app and the way it presents the options for changing the DNS. In comparison, on Android Pie, the DNS option is straightforward. You go to Settings > Network & Internet > Advanced > Private DNS. Bam, there it is, it’s a one-time setting and it works across all networks (Wi-Fi and Mobile). Even if you don’t remember the option’s location, you can just open Settings on your Android device and type DNS and it will display the option for you. Do the same thing on iOS, and you get nothing, it’s not a searchable option. Source: How to configure the DNS in iOS (gHacks - Martin Brinkmann)
  11. I have a domain name ending in .TK, from freenom and webhosting supplied by bplaced. Do I use freenom's DNS to add info. from bplaced or vice-versa? In other words do I tell the host of the web site about the domain, the other way around or do I have to tell each about the other? The host of the website offer their own domain buying service which confuses things (for me). freenom talk about 20202020 or 20202121 as servers and bplace talk about DNS Crec or records? I'd appreciate someone familiar running through the setup procedure as although they have tried to translate from German to English their instructions are not very clear to me. is this right?
  12. Mozilla published a list of requirements that companies need to meet if they want to be included as Trusted Recursive Resolvers for Firefox's upcoming DNS-over-HTTPS feature. DNS-over-HTTPS aims to improve user privacy, security and the reliability of connections by sending and receiving DNS information using HTTPS. Mozilla ran a Shield study in 2018 to test the DNS-over-HTTPS implementation in Firefox Nightly versions. The organization selected Cloudflare as its partner for the study after Cloudflare agreed to Mozilla's requirements to not keep records or sell or transfer data to third-parties. Firefox users may configure DNS-over-HTTPS in the browser. Mozilla plans to make it the default in Firefox going forward; while that is beneficial overall, doing so comes with its own set of issues and concerns. Firefox will use the feature for DNS related activities and not the DNS configured on the computer. Means: local hosts files, resolvers, or custom DNS providers will be ignored. The selection of Cloudflare as the first partner was controversial. Mozilla plans to make DNS-over-HTTPS the default in the Firefox web browser. Firefox users may still disable the feature once Mozilla makes the switch from off to on though. The organization wants to select a number of companies for use as Trusted Recursive Resolvers in the Firefox web browser. To address concerns in regards to privacy, Mozilla created a list of policies that these organizations need to conform to. User data may only be retained for up to 24 hours and that needs to be done "for the purpose of operating the service". Aggregate data may be kept for longer. Personal information, IP addresses, user query patterns, or other data that may identify users may not be retained, sold, or transferred. Data gathered from acting as a resolver may not be combined with other data that "can be used to identify individual users". Rights to user data may not be sold, licensed, sublicensed or granted. Resolver must support DNS Query Name Minimisation (to improve privacy, the resolver does not send the full original QNAME to the upstream name server). The resolver must not "propagate unnecessary information about queries to authoritative name servers". Organizations need a "public privacy notice specifically for the resolver service". Organizations need to publish a transparency report "at least yearly". The company that operates the resolver should not block or filter domains unless required by law. Organizations need to maintain public documentation that lists all domains that are blocked and maintain a log that highlights when domains get added or removed. The resolver needs to provide an "accurate NXDOMAIN response" when a domain cannot be resolved and not alter the response, e.g. redirect a user to alternative content. Mozilla's system will be opt-out means that it is enabled by default for all Firefox users if Mozilla does not change that prior to integration in Firefox Stable. Source: Mozilla still on track to enable DNS-over-HTTPS by default in Firefox (gHacks - Martin Brinkmann)
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  14. In recent years, there has been an explosion of services designed to let you access geo-restricted content from anywhere in the world. Originally, VPNs were all the rage. But with the VPN clampdown by services like Netflix and BBC iPlayer, some users have turned to smart DNS providers instead. For people who are desperate to access such apps, they both have pros and cons. Of course, changing your DNS servers or using a VPN can have exceptional benefits outside the world of geo-blocking. However, many users won’t care about those benefits. To help you out, I’m going to focus on the two solutions specifically from the standpoint of someone who is using them to access blocked content. What are they? How to they work? And, most importantly, what impact do they have on your online security? Keep reading to find out. What Is a VPN? A VPN (Virtual Private Network) lets you connect to a secure private network remotely. They are widely used by companies to allow employees to access databases and business-critical apps when they are out of the office. Connecting to a VPN (such as ExpressVPN or any provider in our best VPNs list) will direct all your internet traffic to the new network, and you effectively do your browsing through that network. In addition to getting around geo-blocking, VPNs significantly improve your online security and privacy. In an age when it seems like every company in the world is trying to get access to your data and browsing history, everyone should be using one. What Is DNS? DNS stands for “Domain Name System.” It’s like the phone book of the internet. DNS servers are responsible for pairing web domains (such as google.com) with the site’s underlying IP address. As such, changing your DNS provider away from your ISP’s default service can bring awesome benefits, including faster browsing, parental controls, and increased security technology. Unlike regular DNS, smart DNS directs users to a proxy server which is specifically designed to help unblock restricted content. How Do VPNs Help Access Restricted Content? When connecting to a VPN, your computer acts like it’s in the physical location of the VPN network. More importantly, websites see an IP address in a particular location and automatically assume you’re based there. For example, if you live in the United Kingdom and connect to a VPN in the United States, websites will display the American version of the site. What’s the Problem With VPNs? In the last couple of years, websites that offer streaming content have started blocking users on VPNs. It’s surprisingly straightforward to achieve: the companies collate a list of IP addresses used by VPN providers and block any traffic that originates from them. Of course, some IP addresses will always slip through the cracks, thus resulting in a game of whack-a-mole between the content providers and VPN companies. How Do DNS Servers Help Access Restricted Content? With the ever-decreasing reliability of VPNs for accessing geo-blocked content, users have been migrating to smart DNS providers instead. The principle is the same as VPNs: both your computer and websites you visit are spoofed into thinking you’re in a different place from your true locale. However, while the effect for the user is the same, the underlying process is very different. A smart DNS will receive information about a user’s location and change it to a new location before resolving the IP query. It does this by routing all your traffic through a dedicated proxy server. The server is located in the country where the website you want to visit is based. The Security Implications of VPNs VPNs are the number one weapon in the battle to keep yourself safe from prying eyes. If you use a VPN, the biggest benefit is encrypted traffic. A hacker won’t be able to see what you’re doing online, and neither will your ISP. It passes through a secure tunnel to the VPN network, and won’t be visible by anyone until it enters the public internet. And remember, if you only visit HTTPS sites, your browsing will always be encrypted. If you’re choosing a VPN provider, you still need to pay attention to the VPN protocols. Most providers offer SSL/TLS, PPTP, IPSec, and L2TP — but they are not all equal, especially from a security standpoint. For example, there are known vulnerabilities with PPTP, with many problems deriving from the authentication processes it uses. As a rule of thumb, you should use SSL protocols. The most security-conscious VPNs won’t even anonymously log traffic. Theoretically, logs could allow a VPN provider to match an IP address and a time stamp to one of their customers. If the provider finds itself on the end of a court’s subpoena because some of its users have been accessing illegal content or downloading copyrighted videos, the company might potentially “fold” rather quickly and relinquish any information they have. The Security Implications of Smart DNS Smart DNS servers are not security measures. Yes, some top-end DNS providers introduce technology such as DNS-over-HTTPS and DNSSEC, but you won’t find those features on services that solely focus on forging your location. Most importantly, DNS servers do not encrypt your data. This dramatically increases their speed compared to VPNs (which is a big reason why they’re popular among cord-cutters), but they will not hide your traffic from companies, websites, your ISP, governments, or anyone else who wants to spy on you. Ultimately, all your traffic is logged against your IP address, and anyone with the right tools can view it. You’re also putting yourself at risk from man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM). MITM attacks occur when an attacker is intercepting and altering any traffic between two parties who believe they are communicating directly with each other. DNS servers are one of the main ways in which hackers launch MITM attacks. It is very easy for an unscrupulous smart DNS provider to offer rock bottom prices then conduct DNS hijacking on all its customers. Look no further than the now infamous Hola VPN incident to see how low some people are willing to stoop in the pursuit of profit. Before signing up to a smart DNS provider, spend a few hours carefully studying the company’s privacy policy. It will help shed light on what your provider is logging, what it knows about you, and if it is profiting off your data. The Bottom Line If you are desperate to watch the latest season of Orange Is The New Black, you need to give VPNs a wide berth. They are unreliable and no longer fit for purpose if you want to unblock content. Instead, you should use a smart DNS service. However, users should also use a VPN service. If you value your privacy and security, there is no better way to keep yourself safe online. Remember, smart DNS providers do not help your security — if anything, they hinder it. Article source
  15. tao

    Today we mitigated

    On May 31, 2018 we had a 17 minute outage on our resolver service; this was our doing and not the result of an attack. Cloudflare is protected from attacks by the Gatebot DDoS mitigation pipeline. Gatebot performs hundreds of mitigations a day, shielding our infrastructure and our customers from L3/L4 and L7 attacks. Here is a chart of a count of daily Gatebot actions this year: In the past, we have blogged about our systems: Meet Gatebot, a bot that allows us to sleep Today, things didn't go as planned. Gatebot Cloudflare’s network is large, handles many different types of traffic and mitigates different types of known and not-yet-seen attacks. The Gatebot pipeline manages this complexity in three separate stages: attack detection - collects live traffic measurements across the globe and detects attacks reactive automation - chooses appropriate mitigations mitigations - executes mitigation logic on the edge The benign-sounding "reactive automation" part is actually the most complicated stage in the pipeline. We expected that from the start, which is why we implemented this stage using a custom Functional Reactive Programming (FRP) framework. If you want to know more about it, see the talk and the presentation. Our mitigation logic often combines multiple inputs from different internal systems, to come up with the best, most appropriate mitigation. One of the most important inputs is the metadata about our IP address allocations: we mitigate attacks hitting HTTP and DNS IP ranges differently. Our FRP framework allows us to express this in clear and readable code. For example, this is part of the code responsible for performing DNS attack mitigation: def action_gk_dns(...): [...] if port != 53: return None if whitelisted_ip.get(ip): return None if ip not in ANYCAST_IPS: return None [...] It's the last check in this code that we tried to improve today. Clearly, the code above is a huge oversimplification of all that goes into attack mitigation, but making an early decision about whether the attacked IP serves DNS traffic or not is important. It's that check that went wrong today. If the IP does serve DNS traffic then attack mitigation is handled differently from IPs that never serve DNS. Cloudflare is growing, so must Gatebot Gatebot was created in early 2015. Three years may not sound like much time, but since then we've grown dramatically and added layers of services to our software stack. Many of the internal integration points that we rely on today didn't exist then. One of them is what we call the Provision API. When Gatebot sees an IP address, it needs to be able to figure out whether or not it’s one of Cloudflare’s addresses. Provision API is a simple RESTful API used to provide this kind of information. This is a relatively new API, and prior to its existence, Gatebot had to figure out which IP addresses were Cloudflare addresses by reading a list of networks from a hard-coded file. In the code snippet above, the ANYCAST_IPS variable is populated using this file. Things went wrong Today, in an effort to reclaim some technical debt, we deployed new code that introduced Gatebot to Provision API. What we did not account for, and what Provision API didn’t know about, was that and are special IP ranges. Frankly speaking, almost every IP range is "special" for one reason or another, since our IP configuration is rather complex. But our recursive DNS resolver ranges are even more special: they are relatively new, and we're using them in a very unique way. Our hardcoded list of Cloudflare addresses contained a manual exception specifically for these ranges. As you might be able to guess by now, we didn't implement this manual exception while we were doing the integration work. Remember, the whole idea of the fix was to remove the hardcoded gotchas! Impact The effect was that, after pushing the new code release, our systems interpreted the resolver traffic as an attack. The automatic systems deployed DNS mitigations for our DNS resolver IP ranges for 17 minutes, between 17:58 and 18:13 May 31st UTC. This caused DNS resolver to be globally inaccessible. Lessons Learned While Gatebot, the DDoS mitigation system, has great power, we failed to test the changes thoroughly. We are using today’s incident to improve our internal systems. Our team is incredibly proud of and Gatebot, but today we fell short. We want to apologize to all of our customers. We will use today’s incident to improve. The next time we mitigate traffic, we will make sure there is a legitimate attack hitting us. < Here >
  16. Jime234

    Changing Mobile Data DNS

    Hi, I wanted to change the DNS of the Mobile Data of my Android Smart Phone. Its a simple process to Change DNS of WiFi but Mobile Data is just something else.. I've searched and tried some apps to change DNS but then I don't know it worked or not, there is no way to check ! Has anyone here tried it ?
  17. Giveaway : 3 Months of Smart DNS Proxy Service for FREE. Promoted Subscription : Lifetime 57% Discount No credit card needed! This promotion also includes lifetime special discount of up to 57%. Users will not be effected from any future price increase! Smart DNS Proxy provides access to over 140+ global video and music streaming services including American Netflix, Hulu Plus, BBC iPlayer, Pandora, etc. You can find all List Of Supported Services Here. Service works with multiple devices: PC, Mac, Linux, iPad, iPhone, iPod, Android Tablet/Phone, PS3/4, Xbox One/360, Chromecast, Roku, NowTV, AppleTV and many other Smart TVs. Here is the Promo Link for this Deal. http://www.smartdnsproxy.com/?afid=5ee8cf37a482 (In order to benefit from 3 month giveaway afid has to be kept on the link!) * When you click Sign Up Page, you will see 92 days free service deal information. ** This giveaway promotion is only for nsane forum users *** For any support related queries please contact with Smart DNS Proxy Support Team here or live chat on the website. HAVE FUN! :D
  18. selesn777

    NetSetMan Pro 3.7.2 Retail

    NetSetMan Pro 3.7.2 Retail NetSetMan is a network settings manager which can easily switch between 6 different, visually structured profiles including IP addresses, gateways (incl. Metric), DNS servers, WINS servers, IPv4 and IPv6, extensive WiFi managment, computer name, workgroup, DNS domain, default printer, network drives, NIC status, SMTP server, hosts and scripts. NetSetMan offers you a powerful, easy-to-use interface to manage all your network settings at a glance. Main features: Management for network settings (LAN & WLAN)Tray-Info for all current IP settingsNSM Service to allow the use without admin privilegesAdministration for defining usage permissionsQuick switch from the tray iconAuto-saving of all settingsCommand line activationQuick access to frequently used Windows locationsTwo different user interfaces (Full & Compact)3.7.2 - 2014-04-29 Website: http://www.netsetman.com/ OS: Windows XP / Vista / 7 / 8 (x86-x64) Language: Ml Medicine: Keygen Size: 3,24 Mb.
  19. PointDNS says most of its DNS servers are online again after a massive DDoS attack late last week took down the service provider. A post on the company’s Twitter account on Friday said the provider was adding nameservers and working with network providers to restore service to its customers. Many of those same customers took to social media complaining about downtime and unavailability of their own websites and services. According to its website, PointDNS services more than 220,000 domains worldwide. Earlier today, a post from parent company Copper.io said services were “back to normal.” This was the second large attack against a DNS provider in the last two weeks. On April 30,UltraDNA mitigated a DDoS attack that kept most of its customers offline for the better part of a day. The SANS Institute’s Internet Storm Center said the attack peaked at 100 Gbps against one of UltraDNS’ customers. The attack resulted in latency issues for other UltraDNS customers. Last week, Incapsula, a cloud-based application delivery company that also sells security services, said it fought back a 25 million packets per second DDoS attack and that many of the DNS queries held non-spoofed IP data. This stands in contrast to many other massive DDoS attacks of late, in particular reflection or amplification attacks, that rely on spoofed addresses to send massive quantities of bad traffic at a target. The Incapsula-mitigated attack was traced back to IP addresses belonging to a pair of DDoS protection services, which are designed for high-capacity traffic management, Incapsula said. Hackers can take advantage of this to pull off DDoS attacks without amplification. These latest attacks, meanwhile, continue a trend of volumetric DDoS attacks reaching new heights. A recent report from Arbor Networks said the provider has already tracked more than 70 DDoS attacks that topped 100 Gbps or more of malicious traffic. The largest on record reached between 325 Gbps and 400 Gbps of traffic. Almost all of these attacks rely on DNS reflection or a growing number on network time protocol amplification attacks. In both cases, IP addresses are spoofed as the target, and massive amounts of traffic is sent their way at no cost to the attacker. US-CERT issued an advisory in January warning companies that hackers were exploiting NTP vulnerabilities to flood networks with UDP traffic. NTP servers are publicly available machines used to synchronize computer clocks. With NTP amplification attacks, hackers exploit the MON_GETLIST feature in NTP servers, which returns the IP address of the last 600 machines interacting with an NTP server. Monlists are a classic set-and-forget feature and are vulnerable to hackers makingforged REQ_MON_GETLIST requests enabling traffic amplification. With DNS amplification attacks, attackers take advantage of any number of the 28 million open DNS resolvers on the Internet to launch large-scale DDoS attacks. The motivations are varied. Ideological hackers use them to take down services in protest, while profit-motivated criminals can use DDoS as a cover for intellectual property theft and financial fraud. Source
  20. ramonjosegn

    Smart DNS Proxy - Giveaway suscription

    Smart DNS Proxy is a versatile DNS service that works on many devices. You can use it to unblock websites, stream music and videos. It is faster than VPN, and for a limited time it is FREE! I am testing and is works very fine and speedy http://www.smartdnsproxy.com/
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